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If NTERNATIONAL LAW HAS, at least since the time of Grotius, recognized 
Jlthe right of States to regulate the seas adjacent to their coasts and to 
enforce their laws against foreign vessels. The rights of regulation and 
enforcement included principally the subjects of customs, fisheries, health and 
immigration. Until the twentieth century, coastal States were primarily 
concerned with the protection of their territory, including their neutrality in 
cases of war between other States. In the present century, additional concerns 
have arisen: the conservation and management of the diminishing living 
resources of the sea and seabed, the exploration and exploitation of the 
nonliving resources of the seabed, and the protection and preservation of the 
marine and coastal environment. 
The modem international law of the sea, reflected in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, allows States to assert and exercise a 
multitude of sovereign rights and jurisdictions in zones beyond the territorial 
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sea. The Convention is comprehensive and detailed in these respects. In 
respect of the manner of enforcement of these sovereign rights and 
jurisdictions, however, the Convention is for the most part silent. Resort must 
be had to principles and rules of customary international law in assessing the 
rights and responsibilities of States in the enforcement of their powers and 
rights under the Convention. 
In the exercise of those powers of regulation that cannot, or cannot always, 
be carried out by authorities on land, States have used a variety of vessels and 
officials. Some States deploy their navies and air forces in this role, 
supplementing them where necessary with vessels and officials operated and 
staffed by such agencies as customs, environment, fisheries, health, and 
immigration departments. Other States have a designated coast guard service, 
which carries out all law enforcement activities at sea in peacetime. 
Where navies are used in peacetime law enforcement roles, it is obvious that 
much of the training directed towards their primary task is also relevant to the 
task of policing maritime zones. In particular, the principle of graduated force l 
has application in the exercise of the right of approach, stopping, boarding, 
searching and seizing foreign merchant vessels. Rules of engagement and 
special procedures are regularly rehearsed and exercised. Where a coast guard 
or other'govermental enforcement agency is employed in these roles, it too will, 
or should, be guided by the same principles and rules. Moreover, in time of 
armed conflict these maritime forces are likely to be integrated into the war 
, effort, and their crews must be capable of swift adaptation to traditional naval 
roles. The of experience between roles, and between the 
forces employed in those roles, ought to be consciously encouraged in times of 
peace. 
The modem international law of the sea, with its concession of expansive 
zones of national sovereignty or jurisdiction, together with its concerns for 
access to natural resources, navigational freedoms, and the protection of the 
natural environment, presents many possibilities for dispute between States. 
Unlawful, unjustifiabty forceful, or clumsy law enforcement can be the 
occasion not only of disputes but even of armed conflict. 
States take up their rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction in their maritime 
zones and exercise them in accordance with their domestic laws. These laws 
mayor may not be, in accordance with international law. In some cases, 
domestic laws with respect to enforcement may date back to earlier times and 
may be inconsistent with modem international law, or, being administered by 
different departments, lack congruity with other domestic laws. 
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A distinction is commonly observed in the assertion and exercise of 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in national maritime zones and on the high 
seas between nationals and national vessels of the enforcing State, and foreign 
vessels and persons. This distinction derives from two considerations. In the 
first place, international law does not, in general, concern itself with matters 
arising between a State and its own citizens, especially in relation to the 
enforcement oflaws to which the citizen owes obedience. In the second place, 
constitutional considerations may arise as to the use of the regular armed 
forces, as distinct from police and other civilian governmental agencies, in the 
enforcement of laws against citizens. 
The Powers and Manner of Enforcement of Coastal State Rights and 
Jurisdictions under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982 (LOS Convention) 
There was an evident reluctance at the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS Ill) to formulate in detail prescriptions of the 
manner of enforcement of the various sovereign rights and jurisdictions 
accorded to coastal States by the resulting Convention. Where the 
Convention incorporates the texts of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, 
the same euphemisms or evasions are repeated. In the parts of the LOS 
Convention that are new, references are scattered and are not harmonious, 
reflecting the division ofUNCLOS III into three main committees and various 
working groups. 
The Territorial Sea. Since a coastal State's full sovereignty extends to its 
territorial sea, in principle it enjoys plenary powers of enforcement of its laws in 
those waters. However, in view of the international community's interest in the 
right of innocent passage through territorial seas, and especially in the right of 
transit passage through, over, and under those parts of the territorial sea that 
comprise straits used for international navigation, certain restrictions are 
placed on enforcement powers. 
In relation to innocent passage, there is a general restriction that a coastal 
State "should not" exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board a foreign vessel to 
arrest any person or conduct an investigation unless the consequences of the 
crime, committed on board the foreign vessel while in passage, extend to the 
coastal State; the crime affects the peace of the coastal State or the good order 
of the territorial sea; assistance has been requested by the master of the vessel 
or the authorities of the flag State; or such measures are necessary for the 
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suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotics. It will be noted that the words used 
are "should not" and are thus not an outright prohibition (LOS Convention, 
art. 27 (1)). However, this mild restriction does not apply to an arrest or 
investigation on board a vessel in the territorial sea after it has left the internal 
waters of the coastal State. Nor does it apply in respect of offenses committed 
against laws validly applying in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where the 
vessel has subsequently entered the territorial sea. The sole outright 
prohibition is of arrest and investigation on board a foreign vessel in innocent 
passage in respect of crimes committed on board before the vessel, proceeding 
from a foreign port, entered the territorial sea. An exception is enforcement 
actions taken pursuant to laws applying in the EEZ and to certain marine 
pollution offenses, as allowed under Part XII of the LOS Convention. 
By contrast, in relation to the exercise of civil jurisdiction by way of arrest or 
levy of execution against a vessel in innocent passage, the prohibition is made 
mandatory by the LOS Convention, Article 28(2), except in respect of 
obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the vessel itself in the course of 
or for the purpose of a voyage through the waters of the coastal State.2 
It is axiomatic that in the territorial sea as elsewhere at sea and on land, the 
international law doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids any interference with, 
or attempt at law enforcement on board, a foreign warship or a government 
vessel in noncommercial service. However, it is unclear whether vessels 
exercising their rights of transit passage through straits have any degree of 
immunity from being stopped and boarded (or aircraft from being diverted and 
ordered to land).3 There is no express provision in the Convention allowing for 
the enforcement-as distinct from the prescription-of coastal State laws. 
Article 34, dealing with the legal status of waters forming straits used for 
international navigation, does not entirely resolve the problem, since it is not 
clear whether it means that all other provisions relating to the territorial sea 
apply except insofar as they are inconsistent with a provision applying to transit 
passage, or whether it is speaking merely of prescription and not of 
enforcement, which is subject to the specific regime of Part rn.4 The undoubted 
implication is that such powers should be exercised with restraint and only be 
invoked, by analogy with Article 27, where there are significant effects on the 
coastal State, or under general international law by way of self, preservation in 
the face of an imminent peril. Article 38 (3) provides that "any activity which is 
not an exercise of the right of transit passage through a strait remains subject to 
the other applicable provisions of the Convention." This may be understood to 
bring in Article 25, allowing the coastal State to take the "necessary steps" in its 
territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent. The applicability of 
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Article 25 is made plausible by the consideration that, before the entry into 
force of the LOS Convention, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, and customary international law, regarded straits 
transit passage as merely a nonsuspendable form of innocent passage. A 
generally cautious approach appears to be confirmed by the LOS Convention, 
Article 233, which provides for the exercise of enforcement powers specifically 
in relation to pollution offenses by vessels transiting straits only where the 
violation causes or threatens major damage to the marine environment of the 
straits. State practice under the Convention may clarify the matter in future. 
State practice before the Convention came into effect would support the 
existence of a general power to enforce laws against vessels transiting straits, at 
least where the offenses are serious.5 
Nothing is said in the Convention generally about the manner of 
enforcement by the coastal State of its laws in the territorial sea. In relation to 
vessels in innocent passage, it provides that "the coastal State may take the 
necessary steps in the territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent." 
The expression "necessary steps" derives from the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 16(1), and broadly 
encompasses the standard procedures of approach, stopping, boarding, 
investigation, and possible arrest. The word "prevent," however, if it stood 
alone and had no earlier history, might suggest that a coastal State had the 
power only to prevent non, innocent passage by, not arrest and punish, the 
foreign vessel. But such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
presumption of full residual sovereign powers in the territorial sea. It would also 
be contrary to the clear implications of Articles 27 (5) and 220(2) of the LOS 
Convention, the latter provision relating to the enforcement of pollution laws 
in the territorial sea, including in relation to vessels in innocent passage. The 
power to "prevent" merely offers the coastal State, in this context, a more 
agreeable alternative to arrest and prosecution of an offending vessel, that is, by 
barring its access or diverting it away from the territorial sea.6 
Archipelagic Waters. Although the theory on which claims to archipelagic 
waters were made, beginning with Indonesia in the 1950s, would necessarily 
regard them as internal waters and thus even more firmly under exclusive 
coastal State sovereignty than territorial waters, the development and 
acceptance of the concept during UNCLOS III resulted in a substantial 
equating of archipelagic waters with territorial waters, and archipelagic sea 
lanes passage with transit passage through and over international straits. The 
wording of LOS Convention Article 49 on the legal status of archipelagic 
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waters is substantially identical with that of Articles 2 and 34. There is a right of 
innocent passage through archipelagic waters not included in archipelagic sea 
lanes, and the regime expressly incorporates by reference the whole of Part II, 
Section 3, of the Convention on innocent passage in the territorial sea (LOS 
Convention, art. 52(1». Similarly, the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
and overflight applies Articles 39,40,42 and 44 on transit passage through and 
over straits mutatis mutandis (LOS Convention, Art. 54). Whatever fine points 
of distinction between archipelagic sea lanes passage and straits transit passage 
there may be argued to exist,7 from the point of view of law enforcement the 
legal environment of archipelagic waters is not substantially different from that 
of the territorial sea. 
The Contiguous Zone. The contiguous zone, under the LOS Convention, may 
extend to a maximum breadth of twenty,four nautical miles from land or from 
territorial,sea baselines. It occupies the sea area lying between that limit and 
the outer limit of the territorial sea. In relation to the four kinds of laws 
applying to its land territory or its territorial sea, in which prevention or 
enforcement activities may be carried out in its contiguous zone (customs, 
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws), the coastal State "may exercise the 
control necessary to" prevent infringement of those laws by inbound vessels or 
to punish infringements committed by vessels in its territory or territorial sea 
when they are outward bound in the contiguous zone (LOS Convention, art. 
33). 
The phrase "may exercise the control necessary to" in Article 33 should be 
compared with the phrase "may take the necessary steps" in Article 25(1), 
applying to the territorial sea, discussed above. Is there a practical difference? It 
must be remembered that the contiguous zone is not a zone of coastal State 
sovereignty or even of coastal State jurisdiction; it is a police zone.8 Its residual 
status, even taking into account that it is included in the exclusive economic 
zone, is that of high seas. As a consequence, the rights exercisable by the 
coastal State in its contiguous zone are of a distinct character and are to be 
accorded differently depending on whether the action taken is preventive or 
punitive. In the former case (inbound vessels), it is arguable that arrest is 
precluded, since by definition no offense has yet been committed. In the latter 
case (outbound vessels) an offense has been committed and may be dealt v.ith 
accordingly; this requires no more qualification of coastal State powers than of 
hot pursuit, except that the pursuit need not have begun in the territorial seaY 
The right to arrest inbound vessels in the contiguous zone in respect of 
apprehended immigration offenses was left open by the Privy Council in 1948 
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by reason of the fact that the vessel concerned was statelessjlO the right to arrest 
may still be in doubt, but it might be cured by the enactment by a coastal State 
of a law applicable in its contiguous zone prohibiting navigation with the 
intention of breaching coastal State laws in its territorial sea or territory.ll 
The Exclusive Economic Zone. As might be expected from the limitation of a 
coastal State's legislative powers over its EEZ, and the high value placed on the 
freedoms of navigation enjoyed by other States in the zone (subject only to the 
rights and jurisdiction given the coastal State in relation to the natural 
resources of the zone and structures connected therewith), the specification of 
enforcement powers is expressed by the LOS Convention in notably 
circumscribed terms. Indeed, the very fact that enforcement powers are spelled 
out in Part V of the Convention, dealing with the regime of the EEZ, whereas 
they are merely assumed or implied in relation to the territorial sea, 
archipelagic waters, and the contiguous zone, indicates that they are regarded 
as more sensitive matters and are to be construed strictly. 
A general limitation on enforcement of rights, imposed by Article 56(2) of 
the LOS Convention, is that "in exercising its rights and performing its duties 
under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall 
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a 
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention." This general 
limitation applies in respect of all the resources of the EEZ, not merely the living 
resources. 
The specific powers of enforcement given to States in their EEZs by the 
Convention is, however, only in relation to the free,swimming living resources 
of the zone. LOS Convention, Article 73 provides: 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, 
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic 
zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial 
proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance With the laws and 
regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be prompdy released upon the 
posting of reasonable bond or other security. 
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in 
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of 
agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of 
corporal punishment. 
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4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall 
promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken 
and of any penalties subsequently imposed. 
It is to be noted that Article 73 does not apply to the nonliving natural 
resources, such as gas, oil, and minerals, nor to the living sedentary species of 
the zone, which are regarded as belonging to the regime of the continental 
shelfP Because the sovereign rights of the coastal State over nonliving and 
sedentary resources of the EEZ (and of the continental shelf, where that shelf 
extends beyond the outer limit of the EEZ) are stated to be exclusive,!3 it was 
thought unnecessary at UNCLOS III to give to coastal States express power to 
enforce those rights. The Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 
1958 is similarly silent; the power to enforce is implicit. 
The reason why the power and manner of enforcement by coastal States of 
their rights in the water column of their EEZs should be stated explicitly, 
whereas in other zones of national maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction those 
powers are implicit, is that the EEZ is governed by an artificially created 
regime14 that required the striking of a delicate balance between coastal State 
interests in conserving and managing living natural resources and the interests 
of other States in the traditional freedoms of navigation. To underline this 
point, the LOS Convention provides that in relation to disputes concerning the 
release of arrested vessels, compulsory jurisdiction is given to the courts and 
tribunals specified in Article 287, or, failing agreement on another court or 
tribunal, to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention, Art. 292) .15 
Separate consideration will be given below to the special position with 
regard to the enforcement of pollution laws in the EEZ. 
The High Seas. The high seas, being regarded from the time of Grotius onward 
as either res nullius or res communis and incapable of appropriation by any State, 
are an area in which in principle there is no right by any State to interfere with 
the free navigation of vessels and aircraft. The exceptions are set out in Article 
110 of the LOS Convention: 
• Vessels of the same nationality as the intercepting warship or aircraft. 
The exception also applies to vessels which, although flying a foreign flag or 
refusing to show a flag, are in reality vessels of the nationality of the 
intercepting State. 
• Vessels without a nationality. These may include unregistered vessels 
whose national origins or connections are uncertain. Vessels sailing under two 
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or more flags, displaying them according to convenience, may be assimilated to 
vessels without a nationality.16 This reference to "convenience" is not to be 
confused with the popular expression "flags of convenience," which refers to 
vessels registered in countries having open registries or favorable or more 
relaxed registration rules. These vessels do have the nationality of the State of 
registration, notwithstanding that in some cases the control exercised by the 
flag State is not as effective as it ought to be.17 
• Vessels engaged in piracy, the slave trade, or unauthorized broadcasting. 
• Where the acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, 
either a bilateral treaty between the intercepting State and the flag State, or a 
multilateral treaty. IS 
There is a right for warships to verify (he flag in any of the cases above. But if 
suspicions prove to be unfounded, and the intercepted vessel has not 
committed any act justifying them, that vessel is entitled to compensation for 
any resulting loss or damage.19 
The 1982 LOS Convention does not deal with the law of armed conflict. 
Hence it must also be taken into account that acts of interception, boarding, 
and arrest may take place on the high seas in the exercise of belligerent rights, 
in or in execution of decisions of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
Hot Pursuit. Intemationallaw allows for the hot pursuit of vessels in the high 
seas, and arrest there, where an offense has been committed on the land 
territory, internal waters, the territorial sea, or in the EEZ of the pursuing State. 
Where the hot pursuit begins in the contiguous zone, it may be conducted only 
in respect of violations of the rights for which that zone was established. The 
position is the same in relation to pursuit beginning in the EEZ. Pursuit may 
only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal has been given at a distance 
which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship. The right of hot pursuit 
terminates when the pursued vessel enters the territorial sea of its own or of a 
third State.20 There is no reason to terminate the pursuit merely because the 
pursued vessel enters the EEZ of its own or of a third State. 
Although the article on hot pursuit in the Convention appears only in Part 
VII (the High Seas), it must be remembered that this Part applies also to the 
EEZ, by reason of Article 58(2), insofar as its provisions are not incompatible 
with the regime of the EEZ. Hence, a right of hot pursuit may begin in the 
territorial sea or contiguous zone and end in the EEZ. 
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According to customary international law the pursuit must be "hot and 
continuous," that is, sight (which can include identification on radar) must not 
be lost or interrupted.21 Where pursuit is begun by an aircraft, the Convention 
provides that it must be continued until a warship or another aircraft can take 
over the pursuit without interruption. It is not enough for the aircraft merely to 
record a sighting; it must give a signal to the delinquent vessel to stop. The 
position is taken in two Australian enactments that "the pursuit of a person or a 
boat is not taken to be terminated or substantially interrupted only because the 
officer or officers concerned lose sight [defined to include losing output from a 
radar or other sensing device] of the person or boat.,,22 Although this position 
may seem a generous interpretation of customary international law, it is 
probably in accordance with modem realities. 
Offenses against Marine Pollution Laws. The protection and preservation of 
the marine environment were regarded as such important issues at UNCLOS III 
that a separate Part of the Convention (part Xll) is devoted to the subject. 
The essential scheme of the LOS Convention, relies on three enforcement 
authorities in relation to pollution offenses: the flag State of the delinquent 
vessel; the port State visited by the delinquent vessel after the offense; and the 
coastal State whose laws have been violated. It is evident from the provisions of 
Part Xll of the Convention that in the interests of freedom of navigation, these 
alternatives are in descending order of preference: Articles 217, 218, and 220. 
Under this scheme the flag State of the delinquent vessel always has 
jurisdiction to prosecute its own vessel, wherever the offenses may have 
occurred, and it must do so when violations of national laws adopted in 
accordance with applicable rules and standards (principally the Conventions 
sponsored by the International Maritime Organization) have occurred. The 
port State's jurisdiction is mainly concerned with investigation and reporting 
to the flag State, but it may institute proceedings itself at the request of the flag 
State or of the coastal State affected. It may also institute proceedings if it is 
affected in its capacity as a coastal State, where its own territorial waters or EEZ 
have been polluted. 
Coastal State powers over polluting foreign vessels are set out in Article 220. 
This article is arranged in such a way as to require a higher threshold to be 
crossed before enforcement action can be taken the farther from the coast the 
offense is detected. If the delinquent vessel is voluntarily within a port of the 
coastal State affected, proceedings may be brought in respect of pollution 
offenses committed in the territorial sea or the EEZ of that State. If the vessel is 
navigating in the territorial sea of the coastal State and there are "clear grounds 
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for believing" that it has committed a pollution offense in the territorial sea, the 
coastal State may apprehend and prosecute. If, however, the vessel is 
navigating in the territorial sea or the EEZ and there are "clear grounds for 
believing" that an offense was committed in the EEZ of the coastal State, that 
State may not institute proceedings but may only require the vessel to give 
information regarding its identity and its last and next ports of call (i.e., in order 
to facilitate a prosecution by either the flag State or the port State). However, 
in the last set of circumstances, if the violation in the EEZ has resulted in a 
substantial discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of the marine 
environment, the coastal State may undertake a physical inspection of the 
vessel, but still not prosecute. But finally, if there is "clear objective evidence" 
that a vessel in the situation of the last two cases has caused "major damage or 
threat of damage to the coastline or related interests of the coastal State, or to 
any of the resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone," 
then-and only then-may the coastal State prosecute in respect of pollution 
offenses committed in its EEZ. 
The flag State of the delinquent vessel may step in under Article 228 of the 
Convention and assume jurisdiction itself where a coastal State has already 
instituted proceedings in relation to pollution offenses in its EEZ, provided it 
does so within six months. In that event the coastal State must suspend its own 
proceedings, unless those proceedings "relate to a case of major damage to the 
coastal State, or the flag State in question has repeatedly disregarded its 
obligation to enforce effectively the applicable international rules and 
standards in respect of violations committed by its vessels." 
An exception to all of the above is the case of dumping. The term "dumping" 
is not defined in Articles 210 and 216 of the LOS Convention except by way of 
reference to the "international rules and standards established through 
competent international organizations or diplomatic conference for the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment by 
dumping." At present, the chief such international instrument is the London 
Dumping Convention of 1972,23 which lists prohibited and restricted 
substances in annexes. In the case of dumping (which is a deliberate and not a 
negligent activity), the coastal State may enforce its laws in respect of offenses 
committed in its territorial sea, its EEZ, or on its continental shelf, 
notwithstanding that the flag State may also have instituted proceedings. 
The implications of these purely conventional provisions (their status as 
customary law has yet to be established) for freedom of navigation are obvious. 
Confrontation between States might well take the form of a denial by one State 
of navigation rights to the merchant ships, and especially oil tankers, of 
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another on the pretext of pollution offenses. The provisions of the Convention 
make such denial transparently unlawful, except in the case of a deliberate act 
of dumping or a clearly established act of pollution of great magnitude. 
The translation of the Convention rules into the national laws and 
operational procedures of States must be closely watched in future.24 Even in 
the case of States whose laws automatically incorporate the terms of 
international conventions, duly ratified, the terms of the articles discussed 
above may be subject to varying interpretations. 
The Use of Force Against Delinquent Vessels 
The LOS Convention is markedly silent on the specification of the degrees 
of force that may be used against vessels that refuse to stop when ordered to 
bring to, or resist boarding, search, or arrest. All of the provisions of the 
Convention that authorize or imply such police measures appear to assume 
that the delinquent vessel will meekly submit to "enforcement measures" or 
"necessary steps." There was a disinclination at UNCLOS III to discuss such 
distasteful matters. 
Guidance must therefore be sought in customary international law and from 
general principles of law. The general international law rule, applicable to 
self,defense and police,type measures alike, is that no more force may be used 
than is strictly necessary to achieve the legitimate objective and is 
proportionate and reasonable in all the circumstances. In respect of police'type 
enforcement actions, evidence of State practice tends to be anecdotal and 
variable, with some States resorting to the immediate use of weapons to compel 
submission, while others are more patient in exhausting peaceful means.25 
The scant arbitral decisions on the point support the latter approach. The 
I'm Alone26 was an arbitration in 1933-1935 between Canada and the United 
States concerning the sinking of a rum,runner and loss oflife on board. It had 
failed to heave to after a lengthy chase and was fired into by a U.S. Coast Guard 
cutter. The arbitration commissioners held that necessary and reasonable force 
might be used for the purpose of boarding, searching, seizing, and bringing into 
port a suspect vessel; if sinking should occur incidentally as a result of the 
exercise of necessary and reasonable force, the pursuing vessel might be 
blameless. But in this case, the admittedly intentional sinking of the suspect 
vessel was not justified. 
It is difficult to understand this decision in the light of the facts, which 
included a hot pursuit lasting two days during which the I'm Alone tried to 
outrun and outmaneuver its pursuer, except on the unstated basis that a 
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deliberate sinking will in no circumstances (other than in self,defense where 
violent resistance is employed or threatened) be warranted if the offense 
involved is a customs (i.e., purely regulatory) offense.27 In other words, the 
proportionality principle requires the enforcing State to weigh the gravity of 
the offense against the value of human life. Rum,running (during the 
Prohibition era of the United States, which had ended just before the 
arbitration) did not strike the commissioners as sufficient to warrant such 
drastic action. They did not have to consider other cases. It is suggested that 
fisheries, revenue, immigration and other regulatory offenses would fall into 
the same category. So might pollution offenses. This is not only because 
sending a vessel with dangerous cargoes or wastes on board to the bottom 
might only compound the danger, but because of the Convention scheme, 
outlined above, under which the flag State can be required to take 
enforcement action against a delinquent vessel escaping immediate arrest. 
Other cases might justify the use of more vigorous, and perhaps ultimately 
deadly, force, such as piratical vessels, vessels carrying arms to dissidents in the 
enforcing State, or craft carrying large quantities of narcotic drugs. These cases 
might be argued to have the character of self,defense or self, preservation more 
than of enforcement of regulatory laws. 
The Red Crusader28 was also a case involving a regulatory offense, unlawful 
fishing. It was an arbitration between Denmark and the United Kingdom. In 
that case, a boarding party from the Danish fisheries patrol vessel had been 
overpowered and locked up by the crew of an arrested Scottish trawler. The 
trawler then turned and made a run for home waters. A lengthy chase ensued 
in which the Danish vessel fired repeated warning shots. Finally shots were 
fired at the bridge and into the hull of the trawler, despite which the trawler 
succeeded in escaping. The United Kingdom claimed that the force used had 
been excessive. The arbitral tribunal agreed, finding that the force used was 
"without proved necessity." It held that "other means should have been 
attempted, which, if duly persisted in, might have finally persuaded Skipper 
\Vood to stop and revert to normal procedures." 
The lesson of these arbitral cases is that force endangering human life is not 
justified, at least where purely regulatory offenses are concerned.29 A premium 
is thus placed on the skill and equipment of enforcement vessels. Those vessels 
must have adequate visual and auditory signaling capacity, and speed, 
seakeeping capability, and maneuverability adequate to their task. In all cases, 
warning shots are to be used before fire is directed at unmanned parts of the 
pursued vessel. Even warning shots should not be used without first resorting to 
other methods of ordering the vessel to stop.30 Methods other than gunfire are 
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to be used wherever possible, where the pursued vessel refuses to stop, e.g., by 
outmaneuvering, water hoses to short out electrical systems, 
harpooned lines to foul the screws, etc. Instant communications 
are also important in supplementing, where necessary, rules of engagement, 
and for receiving specific instructions from the responsible authorities.31 
The sole reference in the LOS Convention to the degree of force to be used 
in enforcement measures appears in Article 225, which states: "In the exercise 
under this Convention of their powers of enforcement against foreign vessels, 
States shall not endanger the safety of navigation or otherwise create any 
hazard to a vessel, or bring it to an unsafe port or anchorage, or expose the 
marine environment to an unreasonable risk." 
In the light of what has been said, it may be wondered what "endangering 
safety" would be if the pursued vessel deliberately evaded a legitimate approach 
by an investigating or enforcing State vessel. The only sensible construction of 
Article 225 is to read it subject to the general international law principles of 
necessity, proportionality, and reasonableness, and not as a blanket prohibition 
against the use of any degree of force in any circumstances. 
The case of offending civil aircraft raises a special consideration of what is 
necessary, proportionate, and reasonable. Aircraft in flight cannot be 
"stopped" in the way that surface vessels can be; also, they are extremely 
vulnerable to the exercise of the slightest degree of force. They may be 
intercepted and ordered to land at a designated airport, but they may not be 
fired on. Following the incident of the shooting down of a Korean Airlines 
passenger aircraft over Soviet territory in 1983, a Protocol relating to an 
Amendment to the Convention on Civil Aviation was adopted at Montreal in 
1984.32 Article 3 bis was added to the Convention in the following terms: 
The contracting states recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to 
the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, 
the lives of persons on board and the safety of the aircraft must not be 
endangered. This provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any manner 
the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
This provision clearly reserves the right of against armed attack 
under the UN Charter and customary internationallaw.33 
The possibility exists that there may emerge an international jurisprudence 
on the subject of law enforcement activities at sea. Part )0/ of the LOS 
Convention provides for the settlement of disputes arising under the 
Convention. It is a complex scheme, combining compulsory elements with a 
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number of limitations and optional exceptions. States may declare that they 
accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the 
International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VII of the Convention, or a special arbitral tribunal constituted in 
accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes 
specified therein.34 
The provisions of Part XV, Section 3, which contain the limitations and 
exceptions to the applicability of compulsory procedures entailing binding 
decisions, almost defy a reading that would make clear what is included in the 
obligation to submit to compulsory dispute settlement procedures as distinct 
from what is not.35 Disputes concerning law enforcement activities are listed 
among the optional exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement, but only "in 
regard to the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction excluded from the 
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297, paragraph 2 or 3."36 Those 
two paragraphs refer to marine scientific research and fisheries, respectively, 
but only so far as to exclude compulsory jurisdiction in respect of the exercise of 
coastal State discretions under·the Convention. If a coastal State sought to 
. impede navigation or overflight through the assertion of rights not granted by 
the there would be jurisdiction over the. assertiqn, as well as over 
the manner of its exercise. Expressly included in the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedures are cases: . 
a) when it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of the 
provisions of this Convention in regard to the freedoms and rights of navigation, 
overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in regard to other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea specified in article 58; ... 
(c) wnen it is alleged that a coastal State has acted in contravention of specified 
international rules and standards for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment which are applicable to the coastal State and which have 
been established by this Convention or through a competent international 
organization or diplomatic conference in accordance with this Convention.37 
Thus a balance is struck in Part XV, as in Part V of the Convention in relation 
to the EEZ itself, between the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal States 
and the interests of the international community in freedom of navigation. 
The above provisions are directed to cases arising in the EEl, since Article 
297 (1) refers to "the exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction provided for in the Convention." The expression "sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction" is a term of art in the Convention and refers only to the EEl and 
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continental shelf. It seems anomalous, but the provisions of Part XV limiting 
and excepting obligations to submit to binding dispute settlement procedures 
appear to leave entirely open disputes concerning the exercise of powers in the 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, since in these areas the coastal State has 
sovereignty. Thus the enforcement of coastal State laws in territorial seas and 
archipelagic waters, including in relation to straits transit passage and 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, might be made the subject of compulsory 
reference to judicial or arbitral procedures.38 
Restraints on the Use of Force Imposed by Domestic Law 
In proceedings for the enforcement of the various national laws applying in 
the maritime zones of the coastal State, the issue of the use of force may be 
raised. Damages in separate civil proceedings may be sought by an 
apprehended person or shipowner in relation to the use of excessive force, 
although this right may be limited by law.39 
Under the common law, the act of State doctrine may be raised as a defense 
by a naval or other government officer against an action brought by a foreign 
citizen in the enforcing State's courts in respect of a tortious act committed 
against that person or a foreign vessel on the high seas or in a foreign place in 
the execution of duty.40 If the tortious act (e.g., an excessively forceful arrest of 
a foreign fishing boat) occurs in territorial waters, however, the act of State 
doctrine will not apply. Territorial waters will be regarded as equivalent to 
territory for the purposes of the doctrineY Will the contiguous zone and the 
exclusive economic zone be excluded also from the application of the act of 
State doctrine? There is no direct authority, but it is arguable that in the 
exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction within an area conceded by 
international law to the coastal State, and conducted pursuant to national laws 
which give effect to those rights and jurisdictions, that area should be treated as 
national territory for purposes of the act of State doctrine. Indirect support for 
this view is found in the United Kingdom Sea Fisheries Act of 1968,42 which 
protects an officer from civil or criminal proceedings in execution of the Act in 
areas of proclaimed fishery limits. 
It does not appear to be common practice, at least in countries of the 
common law, to provide for a statutory code of enforcement practices in 
relation to law enforcement at sea. Instead, law enforcement officers charged 
with maritime duties are guided by the common law and by any general statute 
governing the use of force in apprehending offenders. 
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The common law on the use of force in effecting an arrest can be taken from 
the following passage from the Criminal Code Bill Commission Report of the 
British Parliament (1879):43 
\Y.Je take one great principle of the common law to be, that though it sanctions 
the defence of a man's person, liberty and property against illegal violence, and 
permits the use of force to prevent crimes, to preserve the public peace, and to 
bring offenders to justice, yet all this is subject to the restriction that the force 
used is necessary; that is, that the mischief sought to be prevented could not be 
prevented by less violent means; and that the mischief done by, or which might 
reasonably be anticipated from the force used is not disproportioned [sic] to the 
injury or mischief which it is intended to prevent. 
The common law also distinguishes between the powers of arrest possessed by 
any person and the powers of arrest of constables. 
These principles are reflected in legislation of Australia, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom with respect to the exercise of the power of arrest, legislation 
which is regarded in all three countries as extending to enforcement action 
under statutes applying in the various national maritime zones. However, there 
are differences in the legislation. 
The Australian Crimes Act of 1914, section 3ZC, provides that "a person 
must not, in the course of arresting another person for an offence, use more 
force, or subject another person to greater indignity, than is necessary and 
reasonable to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the other person after 
the arrest." For the purposes of customs, environmental, fisheries, and 
immigration laws, officials of the relevant departments, and naval officers, are 
merely "persons" within the meaning of this provision, subject to any other 
statutory powers they may have. The use of deadly force seems only to be 
envisaged at the hands of a constable: 
(2) Without limiting the operation of subsection (1), a constable must not, in the 
course of arresting a person for an offence: 
(a) do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm 
to, the person unless the constable believes on reasonable grounds that 
doing that thing is necessary to protect the life or to prevent serious injury 
to another person (including the constable); or 
(b) if the person is attempting to escape arrest by fleeing - do such a thing 
unless: 
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(i) the constable believes on reasonable grounds that doing that 
thing is necessary to protect life or to prevent serious injury to 
another person (including the constable); and 
(ii) the person has, if practicable, been called upon to surrender and 
the constable believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot 
be apprehended in any other manner .. 
It must be assumed to be deliberate that officers engaged in maritime law 
enforcement have not been given the express power possessed by constables to 
use deadly force in self,defense or for the protection of others. The question 
poses itself: why not? It could hardly be that private persons do not have a right 
of self,defensej the criminal law allows this. The reason presumably must be 
that in a code dealing with powers of arrest, private persons are not to be 
encouraged to get so close to offenders that the question arises. If this is so, the 
absence of constabulary powers in maritime law enforcement officers is 
unjustifiable. 
Sections 25, 26, and 27 of the Canadian Criminal Code govern the use of 
force in effecting an arrest and are regarded as applying also to the enforcement 
of fisheries laws.44 Under Section 25 (3), the power possessed by any person to 
arrest another person, unlike under Australian law, does extend to "using force 
that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm [if] he 
believes on reasonable and probable grounds that it is necessary for the purpose 
of preserving himself or anyone under his protection from death or grievous 
bodily harm." Thus the defect under Australian law does not exist in Canada. 
Moreover, the powers given under the Code to "peace officers"-the statutory 
equivalent of a common law constable-are extended to members of the 
Canadian Forces by virtue of the definition of "peace officer" in the Code.45 
This results in their having powers which, if exercised at sea, especially in the 
EEZ, might engage Canada in responsibility under international law for using 
excessive force. The following section of the Code would, at all events, seem to 
conflict with the arbitral decisions in the Red Crusader and I'm Alone cases, 
discussed above: 
25 (4). A peace officer who is proceeding lawfully to arrrest, with or without 
warrant, any person for an offence for which that person may be arrested without 
warrant, and every one lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified, if the 
person to be arrested takes flight to avoid arrest, in using as much force as is 
necessary to prevent escape by flight, unless the escape can be prevented by 
reasonable means in a less violent manner. 
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Fenrick comments that Section 25 (4) gives "a somewhat distorted picture of 
the current state of Canadian law." It has not been relied on in any reported 
cases of law enforcement at sea. He submits that "notwithstanding the wording 
of section 25(4) ... HMC ships should not use force which is intended or is 
likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm for the purpose of enforcing 
fisheries legislation, unless such force is necessary for the defence ofHMC ships 
or for the defence of some other person or vessel under her protection.,,46 In 
other words, he submits that international law should be followed in preference 
to the literal wording of the legislation. 
Exceptionally, national law may itself provide for a special regime of law 
enforcement applying under a particular enactment. This is the case of the 
peculiar-one might say flagrant-provision of Australian and Canadian 
customs legislation inherited from a British model. 
The Australian Customs Act of1901, Section 184, headed "Power to pursue 
ships and aircraft", provides: 
(1) Where the master of a ship refuses or fails to comply with a request ... to 
permit the ship to be boarded, the person in command of any ship in the service 
of the Commonwealth ... or any aircraft in the service of the Commmonwealth 
... may use his ship or aircraft to chase, and, after firing a gun as a signal, fire at or 
into the first-mentioned ship in order to compel it to be brought to for boarding. 
The equivalent Canadian legislation, the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1970, chapter 
CAO, section 141(5), is in essentially the same terms. 
Their common ancestor is the British Smuggling Act of 1833,47 which 
consolidated various enactments going back to the early eighteenth century. 
The provision is retained, but in watered-down language-"may be fired 
upon"-in current United Kingdom legislation.48 
All three enactments are open to serious objection as being contrary to 
contemporary international law. The Australian legislation is even worse, as it 
also permits the same procedure to be applied to offending aircraft.49 
The case of the MN Saiga, before the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, reveals that some other States extend quite draconian domestic 
legislation, normally applicable to land territory, against foreign vessels at sea. 
In that case, a vessel registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was 
arrested in the exclusive economic zone of Guinea for alleged customs offenses. 
Force was used, and two members of the crew of the arrested vessel were 
wounded. The Penal Code of Guinea was cited in argument; it provides that 
"no crime or offense is committed in the case of a killing or wounding 
committed by the forces of order against offenders who as a flagrant offense 
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smuggle at the border and have not complied with the usual demands.,,50 It was 
not necessary for the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the case, to judge the 
compatibility of this provision with international law. 
The Enforcement of Domestic Laws in National Maritime Zones Against 
Citizens and Flag Vessels by Navies of the Enforcing State 
Navies are often used in law enforcement roles in national maritime zones. 
In the case of States which do not have a separate coast guard, fisheries 
protection, or other similar non-naval service, it may be the only enforcement 
agency, or at least enforcement platform, available.51 The advantage of using 
navies is great when States with large maritime areas to protect are faced with 
incursions by technologically advanced and fast, distant-water fishing fleets.52 
There is also an economy of scale and effort, where navies on training exercises 
may be diverted to law enforcement activities as required. 
The disadvantages of using navies in a law enforcement role are chiefly two. 
Most obviously, navies are not primarily intended for law enforcement but for 
national defense. Undue diversion from their primary role is seen as 
undesirable. Second, the powers of naval officers to arrest persons are, at least 
in the case of the common-law countries, no greater than those of an ordinary 
citizen. Any additional powers required must be granted by statute. In this 
connection, there is the additional consideration, again at least in the case of 
the common-law countries, of the traditional reluctance to use the armed 
forces in the enforcement oflaws against citizens. 
In the United States, the Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of the U.S. 
Army or Air Force to enforce domestic laws. This prohibition is extended, as 
a matter of policy, to the Navy and the Marine Corps.53 The United States 
Coast Guard exists for the enforcement of laws against both citizens and 
aliens. Statutory exceptions to the prohibition of the use of the Navy are 
allowed, and they have been made in the case of the counterdrug war.54 
However, the Navy provides only the platform and the equipment; search, 
seizure, and arrest are carried out by Coast Guard personnel embarked. The 
prohibition is not as strict in Australia55 or Canada.56 Although naval officers 
have been invested with statutory powers of arrest under various statutes 
concerned with the enforcement of laws at sea, there is a reluctance to use 
these unless necessary, especially against citizens.57 Normally civilian officials 
holding powers under such legislation as that governing customs and fisheries 
are carried aboard. 
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Into the Next Millenium 
The modern international law of the sea is as unavoidable a feature of the 
arena in which armed conflict may be threatened, or actually conducted, as the 
limitations of the weapons platforms deployed and the state of the weather. 
Certain additional rights and duties arise under the law of armed conflict not 
applicable under the law of the sea in times of peace; but a knowledge of the law 
of the sea, and its inculcation in regular exercises, is an essential part of naval 
and air force training. 
The enforcement of national laws at sea, in exercise of the rights to regulate 
the extensive maritime zones recognized by the LOS Convention and under 
customary international law, necessarily involves a projection of sovereignty or 
of national jurisdiction with a high potential to conflict with the rights and 
interests of other States. Disputes may arise concerning innocent passage 
through the territorial sea, straits transit, and archipelagic sea lanes passage 
and overflight, and the enforcement in the EEZ oflaws not clearly warranted by 
the 1982 Convention or by international rules and standards laid down by 
competent international organizations or under international conventions 
adopted by diplomatic conferences consistent with the Convention. Disputed 
claims to sovereign rights or jurisdiction may lead to confrontation and the 
danger of eventual armed conflict. The international law of the sea will be 
invoked by one or both sides in justification of its position. The national law 
enforcement agencies, whether navies, coast guards, or other forces, acting in 
accordance with national laws and policies that mayor may not be in 
accordance with international law, are the instruments by which that law may 
be violated or vindicated. The potential for mistakes or miscalculations can 
hardly be overstated. 
The principle of graduated force58 underlies the measures that should be 
employed in order to achieve a of the threat of violence and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. It is vital that all maritime law enforcement 
agencies understand this principle and do not engage in actions that are 
needlessly provocative or escalatory. There is consequently a need for close 
coordination of all agencies, with joint training in common doctrine, and the 
observance of integrated rules of engagement in maritime law enforcement 
roles. Since navies, whether they are directly involved in law enforcement or 
not, have the ultimate responsibility of defending the nation against armed 
attack, it is logical that they should assume the primary responsibility for the 
development of doctrine and the coordination of enforcement procedures. 
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It is evident that some States engage in more forceful measures in the 
purported exercise of their sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction than is 
justified by international law. A developed international jurisprudence has not 
yet emerged. The reluctance of States to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of 
international courts and tribunals over questions of the manner of their 
exercise of enforcement powers has been noted. The obligation to submit 
disputes to settlement procedures under the LOS Convention, albeit affected 
by limitations and exceptions, has only existed for the parties to the 
Convention since its entry into force in 1994. The potential for those courts 
and tribunals to develop principles and rules in relation to maritime law 
enforcement may be realized in the early part of the twenty,first century. 
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